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I. INTRODUCTION
A useful tool in attacking arbitration awards may soon be eliminated
from the lawyer's tool box, or at least its usefulness significantly eroded. The
doctrine of "manifest disregard of the law" has been used as a distinct ground
for judicial review of arbitration awards, in addition to the statutory grounds
set forth in Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 2 In its broadest
application, manifest disregard allows a party in an arbitration to vacate the
award if it can be shown that the arbitrator misunderstood or misapplied the
law. This basis for vacatur, even in its most constrained application, strains
the plain language of Section 10 and could even be beyond the intent of the
FAA. In light of this issue, federal courts have not completely embraced the
manifest disregard doctrine, particularly in response to commentary by the
Supreme Court in Hall Street Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc.3 For these reasons,
federal circuit courts now not only disagree on the manifest disregard
doctrine's scope, but also on its very existence.4
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Stolt-Nielsen; however,
the grant on its face does not include the manifest disregard issue.5 Instead,
the Supreme Court will address whether imposing arbitration on parties
whose arbitration clauses are silent on whether manifest disregard is
consistent with the FAA. This issue will determine how businesses approach
settling claims and the extent to which offshore firms choose the United
States as a forum to hear their claims. In other words, the Court has not
expressly undertaken consideration of whether manifest disregard survives
Hall Street. Despite the limited scope of the grant, Stolt-Nielson does provide
1 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
2 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(l}-(4) (2006).
3 Hall Street Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). In Hall Street, the
Court held "that §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA's exclusive grounds for
expedited vacatur and modification" of arbitral awards. Id. at 584.
4 Id. at 583.
5 The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the manifest disregard issue.
Instead, the Court limited cert to the issue of whether imposing class arbitration on
parties whose arbitration clauses are silent on the manifest disregard issue is consistent
with the FAA. Therefore, cert was not granted on the issue of whether the manifest
disregard doctrine survives Hall Street. This Recent Development accordingly limits its
discussion to the manifest disregard standard under the Second Circuit's analysis,
recognizing this issue is not in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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the Court an opportunity to address the manifest disregard issue, regardless
of whether the Court reads Hall Street as being consistent or inconsistent
with the doctrine.
What is clear is that unless the Supreme Court provides more
clarification in Stolt-Nielsen beyond the holding of Hall Street, the scope, as
well as the very existence, of the manifest disregard doctrine will continue to
engender disagreements among federal courts. Moreover, the manifest
disregard doctrine will continue to be fodder for legal commentary. As
discussed below, the Second Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen reasoned that the
manifest disregard doctrine is still very much alive, and upheld its use in
their ruling. The Supreme Court could rule explicitly on the manifest
disregard issue, and Stolt-Nielson offers that chance.6
I. PREFACE TO THE CASE
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., the Second Circuit held
that an arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law when the panel
construed silence in an arbitration agreement to allow class arbitration. In
2003, classwide arbitration broke new ground in Green Tree Financial
Group v. Bazzle,7 when the Supreme Court ruled that when parties agree to
arbitrate, the question of whether the agreement permits class arbitration is
"[a] matter of contract interpretation . .. for the arbitrator, not the courts, to
decide."8 The Second Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen adopted this principle and
found that an arbitration panel properly interpreted a maritime arbitration
agreement-silent on the issue of class arbitration-to not preclude class
arbitration when absent from the contract.
The Second Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen also blew new life into the common
law doctrine of "manifest disregard of the law." The manifest disregard
doctrine has created uncertainty among federal courts since the Supreme
Court's ruling in Hall Street, where the Court mentioned that "§§ 10 and 11
respectively provide the FAA's exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and
modification" 9 of an arbitration award. The Second Circuit reasoned that
6 Of course, if the Supreme Court holds that the doctrine is not an independent, non-
statutory ground for setting aside an award, lawyers still have one more tool for vacating
an award that arguably involves the misapplication of law-that is, using an old fashion
shoehorn to force the facts into one of the statutory grounds for vacatur set forth in
Section 10 of the FAA.
7 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
8 Id. at 453.
9 Hall Street, 552 U.S. 584 (emphasis added).
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while Hall Street may have debated the continuing applicability of the
doctrine, the Supreme Court did not "abrogate the 'manifest disregard'
doctrine altogether."' 0 Having so interpreted the Hall Street decision, the
Second Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen upheld the applicability of the manifest
disregard doctrine, and accordingly found that an arbitration panel had not
met the "manifest disregard" standard.II
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
AnimalFeeds International Corp. ("AnimalFeeds") brought a federal
class action suit against Stolt-Nielsen SA and others12 ("Stolt-Nielsen")
claiming that they were engaged in a "global conspiracy to restrain
competition in the world market for parcel tanker shipping services in
violation of federal antitrust laws."13 AnimalFeeds sued on behalf of a class
of all purchasers of parcel tanker transportation services from Stolt-Nielsen
during the period from August 1, 1998 to November 30, 2002. AnimalFeeds
initially filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, but the action was transferred to the Connecticut District
Court.
Stolt-Nielsen sought to avoid the class action suit and moved for
arbitration-a motion initially denied by the lower court. However, the
Second Circuit later reversed, finding that the parties' transactions were
governed by contracts with enforceable agreements to arbitrate, and that the
antitrust claims in the lawsuit were arbitrable.14 The parties eventually
entered into an arbitration agreement stating, among other things, that the
arbitrators "shall follow and be bound by Rules 3 through 7 of the American
Arbitration Association's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations." 5
t0 Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008).
11 Id. at 87.
12 The other defendants were Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd., Odfjell ASA,
Odfjell Seachem AS, Odfjell USA, Inc., Jo Tankers BV, Jo Tankers, Inc., and Tokyo
Marine Co. Ltd.
13 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 87 (quoting Appellant's Br. 4).
14 See generally JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 183 (2d Cir.
2004) (discussing how Sherman Act claims, as well as state law claims, are arbitrable).
15 See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 88; see also SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS (Am. Arb. Ass'n, 2003) ("Supplementary Rules"), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp/asp?id=21936 (last visited February 2, 2010). The Supplementary
Rules were issued following the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle, which held that when parties agree to arbitrate, the question of whether
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Under Rule 3 of the Supplementary Rules, AnimalFeeds and several co-
plaintiffs who were not parties in the appeal to the Second Circuit demanded
class arbitration. 16 This demand was based upon the provision in
Supplemental Arbitration Rule 3 providing that, upon appointment, an
arbitrator shall determine
whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed
on behalf or against a class (the "clause Construction Award").. . . In
construing the applicable arbitration clause, the arbitrator shall not consider
the existence of these Supplementary Rules, or any other AAA rules, to be a
factor either in favor of or against permitting the arbitration to proceed on a
class basis.17
Therefore, pursuant to the Class Construction Award, an arbitration
panel was assembled to consider the two standard-form agreements between
the parties known as the Vegoilvoy charter party and the Asbatankvoy
charter party.' 8 Both agreements dictated that performance or termination of
the charter party would be in a select location, the parties would appoint an
arbitrator who would rule on the dispute, and any decision by that arbitrator
would be final. 19 However, what proved to be of great significance was that
"both agreements unambiguously mandate[d] arbitration but [were] silent as
to whether arbitration may proceed on behalf of a class." 20
The arbitration panel decided in favor of AnimalFeeds and found that the
agreements permitted class arbitration. Stolt-Nielsen in turn petitioned the
Federal District Court for the Southern District for New York to vacate the
arbitrator's decision. The district court agreed with Stolt-Nielsen and vacated
the award, finding that the award was made in manifest disregard of the
the agreement permits class arbitration is a matter of "contract interpretation [that) should
be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide." Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).
16 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 88.
17 See Supplementary Rules, supra note 15.
18 See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 89. "A 'charter party' is a specific contract, by
which the owners of a vessel let the entire vessel, or some principle part thereof, to
another person, to be used by the latter in transportation for his own account, either under
their charge or his." Id. (quoting Asoma Corp. v. SK Shipping Co., 467 F.3d 817, 823 (2d
Cir. 2006)).
19 See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382,
384 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (outlining the "Asbatankvoy Clause"); see also Stolt-Nielsen, 548
F.3d at 88-89 (outlining the "Vegoilvoy Clause").
20 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 89.
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law.21 AnimalFeeds appealed to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit held
that the arbitration panel did not act in manifest disregard of the law, and
reversed the district court.22
A. Basis of the Suit
The Vegoilvoy and Asbatankvoy charter party agreements failed to
properly delineate a proper class action procedure, which brought about the
action between the parties in Stolt-Nielsen. AnimalFeeds and its co-plaintiffs
argued that "because the arbitration clauses were silent, arbitration on behalf
of a class could proceed." 23 Moreover, AnimalFeeds cited published clause
construction awards under Rule 3 of the Supplementary Rules permitting
class arbitration awards, as well as public policy where the contracts'
arbitration clauses would be unconscionable and unenforceable if class
arbitration was forbidden.24
Stolt-Nielsen argued against class arbitration on three primary grounds.
First, Stolt-Nielsen argued that"because the arbitration clauses were silent,
the parties intended not to permit class arbitration," citing in support that
federal courts and arbitrators regularly denied both class arbitration and class
consolidation. 25 Second, Stolt-Nielsen argued that the arbitration decisions
cited by AnimalFeeds were inapposite because "they were not made in the
context of international maritime agreements, where parties have no
expectation that arbitration will proceed on behalf of a class." 26 Lastly, Stolt-
Nielson offered extrinsic evidence on the negotiating history between the
parties, and their understanding of the arbitration agreements to demonstrate
that the parties did not intend to authorize class arbitration. 27 However,
before the arbitration panel, "Stolt-Nielsen acknowledged that the
interpretation of the contracts at issue here was a question of first
impression." 28
21 See generally Stolt-Nielsen, 435 F. Supp. 2d 382.
22 See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.
2008).





28 Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2008).
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B. The Arbitration Panel's Finding
On December 20, 2005, "the arbitration panel issued a Clause
Construction Award deciding that the agreements permit class arbitration."29
The arbitration panel's decision was based upon three primary foundations.
First, the arbitration panel based its decision "largely on the fact that in all
twenty-one published clause construction awards issued under Rule 3 of the
Supplementary Rules, the arbitrators had interpreted silent arbitration clauses
to permit class arbitration."30 Second, the Court further distinguished the
Stolt-Nielsen case from past law that "prohibit[ed] consolidation of claims
when an arbitration agreement is silent." 31 The Court reasoned that
consolidating two distinct arbitrations with distinct arbitration clauses was
different than the class action arbitration before the panel. Lastly, although
the arbitration agreements regarded maritime action and thus were factually
unique to international shipping, "Stolt-Nielsen's arguments regarding the
negotiation history and context of the agreements did not establish that the
parties intended to preclude class arbitration." 32
C. Reversal ofPanel's Finding and Appeal to Second Circuit
Stolt-Nielsen petitioned the district court to vacate the arbitration panel's
Clause Construction Award; the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York subsequently vacated the panel's decision, reasoning
that the award was made in manifest disregard of the law.33 The district court
found that the arbitration panel "failed to make any meaningful choice-of-
law analysis" 34 and failed to consider that any interpretation of charter parties
should be dictated by the "custom and usage" of federal maritime law. The
district court found that Stolt-Nielsen sufficiently demonstrated that "the
29 Id.
30 Id. at 90.
31 See, e.g., id.; United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993)
(involving a reversal of a consolidation of arbitration proceedings because the
proceedings involved separate agreements).
32 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 90.
33 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
34 Id. at 385
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arbitration clauses here in issue are part of maritime contracts, [and thus]
they are controlled in the first instance by federal maritime law." 35
The district court also found "the result would be the same even if there
was no established maritime rule and state law then governed." 36 On these
grounds, the district court found that because these clearly established rules
of law were presented to the panel and the panel failed to apply them, they
manifestly disregarded the law and the Clause Construction Award must be
vacated. After vacatur, AnimalFeeds appealed to the Second Circuit on the
question of whether the arbitration panel acted in manifest disregard of the
law when it construed silence in the arbitration agreement to allow class
arbitration. The Second Circuit ultimately reversed the district court for the
reasons discussed below.
III. HOLDING OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
The Second Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's order to vacate
the arbitration award on the grounds of manifest disregard of the law.37
Guiding the court's decision was the principle that "it is well established that
courts must grant an arbitration panel's decision great deference." 38 This
deference principle served as the underlying theme of the Second Circuit's
opinion.
In determining whether an arbitration panel's decision can be vacated,
the Second Circuit cited the FAA and the common law principle of manifest
disregard of the law as the governing rules. Under the FAA, arbitral awards
can generally be vacated when an award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means; if there is evidence of partiality or corruption of the
arbitrators; if there is misconduct by the arbitrators; or if the arbitrators
exceed their powers.39 The Second Circuit previously has "also recognized
that the district court may vacate an arbitral award that exhibits a 'manifest
3 5 Id.
3 6 Id. at 386.
37 See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 90 (2d
Cir. 2008) (quoting Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc, 343 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2003).
3 8 Id. (quoting Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d
383, 388 (2d Cir. 2003).
39 See generally 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(1)-(4) (2006).
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disregard' of the law." 40 However, in Stolt-Nielson, the court clearly stated
that it will not "recognize manifest disregard of the evidence as proper
ground[s] for vacating an arbitrator's award." 41
A. The "Manifest Disregard" Standard
First and foremost, the Second Circuit stressed that "a party seeking to
vacate an award on the basis of the arbitrator's alleged 'manifest disregard'
of the law bears a 'heavy burden. "'42 Relying upon Duferco Int'l Steel
Trading v. T Klaveness Shipping A/S, 43 the Second Circuit maintained that
the manifest disregard doctrine allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitral
award only in "those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious
impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent."44 This is based on the
reasoning that "the parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, more
likely than not to enhance efficiency, to reduce costs, or to maintain control
over who would settle their disputes and how-or some combination
thereof."45
On this basis, the Second Circuit decided that manifest disregard must be
interpreted to be more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.
In other words, a "federal court cannot vacate an arbitral award merely
because it is convinced that the arbitration panel made the wrong call on the
law." 46 Looking to the rule articulated in Wallace v. Buttar, the court upheld
the principle that an award should be enforced, despite a court's
disagreement with it on the merits, so long as there is a barely colorable
justification for the outcome reached.47
Instead, the Second Circuit held an award can be vacated if it passes the
court's manifest disregard standard.48 The three-part manifest disregard test
40 See generally Duferco, 333 F.3d at 388 (citing Goldman v. Architectural Iron.
Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor
Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2002).
41 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 91 (quoting Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 193 (2d
Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
42 Id. (quoting GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 2003).
43 Duferco, 333 F.3d at 383.
4 Id. at 389.
45 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2008).
46 Id
47 Id. (quoting Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004)) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added in Wallace).
4 8 Id. at 93.
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requires (1) examining the law allegedly ignored; (2) the application of the
law by the arbitrator; and (3) whether the arbitrator knowingly misapplied or
ignored the law. 49 Without meeting all three prongs of this standard, the
Second Circuit was not willing to vacate an arbitration award.
B. The Effect of Hall Street on the "Manifest Disregard" Doctrine
Before continuing on its argument, the court briefly considered how the
recent Supreme Court decision Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc. affects
the scope or vitality of the manifest disregard doctrine. While the manifest
disregard doctrine was not specifically at issue in Hall Street, the "[Supreme]
Court nonetheless commented on its origins"50 and continued use. 51 So,
while Hall Street mentioned section 10 of the FAA as the "exclusive"
grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, the Second Circuit nonetheless
decided that the Supreme Court's decision to leave the Wilko v. Swan52
decision intact, and not overrule Wilko's manifest disregard argument,
provided ample evidence that the Supreme Court "did not ... abrogate the
'manifest disregard' doctrine altogether." 53
The Second Circuit then took the position that they "view the 'manifest
disregard' doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a mechanism to enforce the
parties' agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial review of the
arbitrators' decision." 54 And, from this standpoint, the Second Circuit
asserted that courts "must therefore continue to bear the responsibly to vacate
arbitration award in the rare instances in which 'the arbitrator knew of the
relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the
outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the
governing law by refusing to apply it.'" 55 Therefore, the Second Circuit,
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d
Cir. 2008). Since Hall Street was decided, "courts have begun to grapple with its
implications for the 'manifest disregard' doctrine. Id. Specifically, the Second Circuit
listed several federal courts that have been on both side of the debate of whether the
doctrine continues to survive or has merely been reconceptualized in the Hall Street
decision.
52 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
53 See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95.
54 Id.
55 Id. (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d
Cir. 2002)).
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finding that the manifest disregard doctrine continues to be a legitimate form
of vacating arbitration awards, analyzed Stolt-Nielsen's arguments to
determine whether the district court correctly decided the arbitration panel
manifestly disregarded the law. 56
C. The Second Circuit's Analysis of Stolt-Nielsen's "Manifest
Disregard" Claim and the District Court's Reasoning
The district court found the arbitration panel "failed to make any
meaningful choice-of-law analysis."57 In this respect, the lower court
reasoned that the arbitrators failed to recognize the dispute was governed by
federal maritime law and ignored the "established rule of maritime law" that
the interpretation of contracts "is . .. dictated by custom and usage." 58 Even
under state law, the district court decided that the arbitration panel was
required to interpret contacts in light of "industry custom and practice." 59
Based on these factors, the district court believed that, along with the
extrinsic evidence provided by Stolt-Nielsen, the panel should have found for
Stolt-Nielsen.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court, and furthermore,
resolved that "the errors . .. identified do not, in our view, rise to the level of
manifest disregard of the law." 60 Each of the three factors: (1) choice of law
analysis, (2) Federal Maritime Rule of Construction in contract analysis, and
(3) state law regarding the availability of class arbitration are discussed
below in turn.
1. Choice ofLaw
The Second Circuit held that the arbitral panel did not manifestly
disregard the law in its choice-of-law analysis. To reach the manifest
disregard standard, the court argued, "the arbitrators must be 'fully aware of
the existence of a clearly defined governing legal principle, but refuse [ ] to
56 Id. at 96.
5 See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
58 Id. at 385-86.
59 Id. at 386.
60 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 2008).
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apply it, in effect, ignoring it.'"61 Instead, Stolt-Nielson briefed the
arbitration panel, addressing choice of law provisions in a footnote and
assuring the panel that choice of law was immaterial to the ultimate
decision. 62 On that basis, the Second Circuit held "this concession bars us
from concluding that the panel manifestly disregarded the law by not
engaging in a choice-of-law analysis and expressly identifying federal
maritime law as governing the interpretation of the charter party language." 63
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit was convinced that the arbitration
panel's award was proper. This conclusion was derived from the arbitration
panel's language regarding the governing law which stated that the panel was
bound to "look to the language of the parties' agreement to ascertain the
parties' intention whether they intended to permit or preclude class action.
This is ... consistent with New York law . .. and with federal maritime
law."6 From this language, the court determined that in a "plausible reading
of the award decision," 65 the panel intended to interpret the charter parties
according to the rules of both New York State law and federal maritime law,
both of which, would render the same result as according to the panel and
Stolt-Nielsen.
2. Federal Maritime Rule of Construction
The Second Circuit held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly
disregard the law with respect to established rules of federal maritime law.66
The Second Circuit arrived at the conclusion that while the district court
stated that interpreting maritime contracts "is very much dictated by custom
and usage," 67 "custom and usage is more of a guide than a rule." 68 Thus,
61 Id. (quoting Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d
383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003).
62 Id. Stolt-Nielsen, in their brief, expressed to the arbitration panel that it would
make no difference whether the panel used New York or federal maritime law to govern
the contracts because the analysis is the same under either. See generally Stolt-Nielsen
Arbitration Br. 7 n. 13.
63 See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 96.
6 Id. (quoting Clause Construction Award 4).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
67 Id. at 385-86.
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according to the Second Circuit, while "custom and usage" should be
considered, influence interpretation, or inform a court's analysis, "it does not
govern the outcome of each case." 69
Additionally, the Second Circuit held that "Stolt-Nielsen cites no
decision holding that a federal maritime rule of construction specifically
precludes class arbitration where a charter party's arbitration clause is
silent." 70 More specifically, the Second Circuit noted that "during oral
argument .. . counsel for Stolt-Nielsen conceded that the interpretation of the
charter parties in this case was an issue of first impression." 71 And, for
whether the arbitration panel misapplied or misinterpreted the "custom and
usage rule," the court has held that "the misapplication .. . of . .. rules of
contract interpretation does not rise to the stature of 'manifest disregard' of
the law."72 Even if there were indications of egregious misapplication of
custom, such "determinations of custom and usage are findings of fact, which
federal courts may not review even for manifest disregard."73
On the above grounds, the arbitration panel acknowledged Stolt-
Nielsen's argument with respect to custom and usage, but concluded that it
failed to establish that the parties to the charter agreements intended to
preclude arbitration. Therefore, "the panel thus considered Stolt-Nielsen's
arguments and found them unpersuasive," 74 resulting in the Second Circuit
finding that the panel did not evidence a manifest disregard for the law.
3. State Law
The Second Circuit determined that the panel did not manifestly
disregard New York State law.7 5 While the Second Circuit agreed with the
district court's finding that New York State law follows a "custom and
practice," the Second Circuit determined that, "it is also [the] state law that
the courts' role in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the
68 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 97 (2d Cir. 2008).
(quoting Great Circle Lines, Ltd. v. Matheson & Co., 681 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1982)
(discussing certain long-standing customs of the shipping industry)).
69 Id. at 98.
70 d
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales
Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843.
7 Id. (quoting Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 193 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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parties at the time they entered into the contract." 76 Regarding Stolt-Nielsen
and AnimalFeeds, the Second Circuit determined that "the arbitration panel
may have concluded that even though the arbitration clauses are silent on the
disputed issue of whether class arbitration is permitted, their silence bespeaks
an intent not to preclude class arbitration."77
Concluding its argument regarding state law custom and practice, the
Second Circuit reasoned that none of the cases cited as precedent "purports
to establish a rule regarding the interpretation of an arbitration clause that is
silent on the issue of class arbitration."78 Therefore, the Second Circuit held
that no state law rule of construction clearly governed the question of
whether class arbitration is permitted by an arbitration clause that is silent on
the issue, "the arbitrators' decision construing such silence to permit class
arbitration in this case is not in manifest disregard of the law."79
D. Stolt-Nielsen's Reference to Past Precedent in the Second and
Seventh Circuits
An argument that was not discussed in the district court was Stolt-
Nielsen's argument that Second Circuit decisions in Glencore, Ltd. v.
Schnitzer Steel Prods.8 0 and United Kingdom v. Boeing Co.,8 along with the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.,82 prohibit class
arbitration unless expressly provided for in an arbitration agreement. 83 Stolt-
Nielsen argued that the failure of the panel to take these cases into
consideration in their award constituted a manifest disregard of the law. The
Second Circuit dismissed this argument finding that Glencore, Boeing, and
Champ are not binding on this case.
The court based its reasoning on the later Supreme Court case of Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, which determined "that when parties agree to
arbitrate, the question whether the agreement permits class arbitration is
generally one of contract interpretation to be determined by the arbitrators,
76 Id. at 99 (citing Evans v. Famous Music Corp., 807 N.E.2d 869, 873 (N.Y. 2004).
77 Id. (emphasis in original).
78 Id
79 gd
80 Glencore, Ltd. V. Schnitzer Steel Prods., 189 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999).
81 United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993)
82 Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
83 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'1 Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 99 (2d Cir. 2008).
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not by the court." 84 In other words, Bazzle abrogated Glencore, Boeing, and
Champ to the extent that they read the FAA to prohibit consolidation, joint
hearings, or class representation, absent express provisions in the relevant
arbitration clause.
While the Second Circuit acknowledged that Boeing, Glencore, and
Champ were instructive insofar as they view the silence of an arbitration
clause regarding consolidation, joint hearings, and class arbitration as
disclosing the parties' intent not to permit such proceedings, the court noted
that "they do not represent a governing rule of contract interpretation under
federal maritime law or the law of New York."85 Therefore, the Second
Circuit determined that in the present case, Bazzle provides the governing
rules of contract interpretation that arbitrators must consult. 86 Therefore, the
Second Circuit ruled that the panel's decision to construe the contract
language at issue between Stolt-Nielsen and AnimalFeeds to permit class
arbitration was not in manifest disregard of the law.87
E. Stolt-Nielsen's Claim that the Arbitrators Exceeded Their Authority
In addition to asserting that the arbitration panel acted in manifest
disregard of the law, Stolt-Nielsen also contended that the arbitration panel
"exceeded its authority."88 This claim falls under the FAA: "where [when]
arbitrators [exceed] their powers," 89 vacatur of an arbitration award may be
possible. The Second Circuit quickly dismissed this claim on the basis that
the parties expressly agreed that the arbitration panel "shall follow and be
bound by Rules 3 though 7 of the American Arbitration Association's
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations."90 Under Rule 3, "the arbitrator
shall determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the
construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration
84 Id. at 100 (Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 452, 453 (2003).
85 Id. at 101.
86 To be sure, Rule 3 of the American Arbitration Association's Supplementary
Rules for Class Arbitrations were established after Bazzle to embody the Supreme
Court's opinion. See also supra note 14.
87 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 101 (2d Cir.
2008).
88 Id. (citing Appellee Br. 18).
89 9 U.S.C. § l0(a)(4).
90 See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d atlOl (citing Class Arbitration Agreement 3.)
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clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class." 91
Based upon the parties' agreement to follow the Supplementary Rules, and
the construction of Rule 3 of the Supplementary Rules, the Second Circuit
ruled that "the arbitration panel did not exceed its authority in deciding that
issue-irrespective of whether it decided the issue correctly." 92
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULING
As the Second Circuit could not find manifest disregard of the law, the
court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to deny the petition to vacate the arbitration
award.93 The reversal by the Second Circuit brings about two important
issues. The first and arguably the more far reaching issue is whether courts
can continue to reverse arbitral awards on the ground that arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law. This issue attracts the keen interest of
arbitration practitioners. The second issue is whether imposing class
arbitration on parties, whose arbitration clauses are silent on the issue, is
consistent with the FAA. This issue could have broad implications for
business by influencing their decisions to settle claims as well as decisions of
international firms to choose the United States as a forum for their business
interests and disputes arising from that business.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari only on the
issue of whether silence in an arbitration agreement permits class
arbitration. 94 Thus, at this stage a decision by the Court will address
imposition of class arbitration in cases where arbitration agreements are
silent on the issue of class arbitration. However, the Supreme Court's grant
of certiorari does not reveal any willingness by the Court to directly address
the manifest disregard issue at this time. It is unknown if the Supreme Court
sees any need or value in addressing the broader issue of the continuing
vitality of the manifest disregard doctrine as a tool to attack arbitration
awards.
What is clear, however, is that in the absence of guidance from the
Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen, the circuit courts will continue to struggle
with the manifest disregard doctrine. While the Second Circuit is not alone in
91 Supra note 14.
92 See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 101.
93 Id. at 102
94 See generally id.
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their belief that the manifest disregard doctrine lives on,95 it is clear that
other courts are not in agreement with the Second Circuit.96 Until this issue is
resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is likely that the common law
doctrine of manifest disregard of the law will continue to cause uncertainty
among the lower federal courts.
ZACHARY L. GOULD
95 The Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, also continued to apply the
"manifest disregard" standard of review, however relying more on the Wilko decision to
buttress their claim. See Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW LLC., 297 Fed App'x 556 (6th Cir.
2008).
96 See Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding
that manifest disregard of the law does not constitute an independent, nonstatutory
ground for vacating awards under the Federal Arbitration Act).
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